And as I said, your scenario would most likely not need a YIP.
Thus emergency voting is not needed.
How do you propose enacting system-wide change without a YIP? The multi-sig holders are not a permanent solution and will eventually be phased out.
As the price of YFI increases, the yield lowers, as it does with increasing stakers. Decreasing rewards deters buy-in.
Ideally, YFI increases because of the increasing yield, not the other way around. If YFI increases while yield doesn’t, that means there’s a premium due to either speculators or people who haven’t done their research. Imagine investing in a company without looking at how it makes money or even its P/E, but only because its stocks are rising.
That is incorrect. The current system does not ensure YFI principal is retained because YFI can go to 0. My suggestion retains voting power also. I don’t see how allowing the treasury to use liquidity creates a conflict of interest between investors and the project. The stakers are investors and the treasury is funded by the project.
It retains principal “in YFI”, as in you can’t lose YFI. I have already outlined how you could lose voting power in all of the methods I listed above. Let me reiterate:
- Loan providing decreases staker voting power by either vote dilution due to double-counting or locking up portions of votes due to outstanding loans
- AMM decreases voting power due to divergence loss
- Synthetics minting decreases the time-weighted power of votes due to illiquidity (as in, you can’t vote whenever you want to hold your vote)
I’m not sure if you noticed but this thread does not have many participants. Most of the replies are from yourself and captainobvious. Hardly a majority.
I’ll throw some sass and say 2>1. But really, out of the 11 posters in this thread, I count 3 neutral/off topic, 3 for, 5 against.
This discussion doesn’t seem to be going anywhere, I suggest we agree to disagree.