Request for Comment. Proposal for government restructuring

TLDR: Imitate what works in a publicly traded company.

We could have a “board of directors” that is elected in a staggered way that controls an amount of votes that is divided up and <= a quorum. Perhaps the directors could specialize and dole out grants in their departments using money from a "YIP 14"like system. This way governance can be more efficiently done. By limiting the directors to less than a quorum it is ensured that if they tried to sneakily push through bad legislation they could be stopped by the YFI holders’ nay. Additionally, voters are rewarded for voting with a share of Ycrv earnings, incentivising engagement with the YIP’s. It is essential that what we create is flexible with adversity and fair to the token holders. This solution introduces a way to allow those who the community believes in to make decisions more effectively.

Why we need this
If anything bad happens to this contract it is essential to quickly discuss, and patch a fix. By the consolidation of different types of experts we can expertly and efficiently propose and implement a solution, even if no one is watching.

Implementation Thoughts

This board could moderate the forum and pin essential forum posts to the decentralized voting page.

The board could get a reward.

People could give their vote to let someone else use it

Please modify this any which way I merely want to discuss how we make decisions.

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I like this idea. I think we need a mechanism for holders to participate, but would be good to make sure that we don’t accidentally shoot ourselves in the face. More professional mgmt would help with that.


Don’t reinvent the wheel, just use voting delegation so everyone can choose who to delegate their vote to.


Is there any documentation on delegating votes and if it’s working for other protocols? If it’s working then great, it seems like a no brainer! I know that personally I’m not voting on all things Comp and I still don’t delegate my votes. That’s not good and so ideally there is a better way to create community engagement. Not sure what the perfect solution is but I agree with @amaz_ng that we need a way to move quickly when it’s called for. Yes on YIP 12 hopefully fixes part of it but might not be enough.

Firstly, I think now that YIP 10: Transitionary YFI Only Voting has passed, we should stick with the existing system for awhile, to understand how group-wide voting among YFI holders is functioning for awhile. This will allow us to detect if there are any issues and address them over time.

Secondly, it is a good point re: trying to encourage voting to meet quorum. The problem however lies in the following: Incentivizing people to vote may lead to people voting regardless of their beliefs just for the sake of a reward. Typically, such incentive behaviour means the person who votes solely for the reward tries to vote with the crowd (whichever vote is leading at the time) on the principle that he/she will try to “do no harm” by sticking with the crowd. This also leads to the variant (which I do not support) which is to incentivize early voting by offering rewards to voters in an early period (e.g. 1st 24 hours).

A method of incentivizing early voting without the corruptive distortion of monetary incentives: The model that I like for incentivizing early voting is to give additional voting power on early votes cast. Here is an example (assumes a 4-week voting period):
All votes cast in week 1: 2.5x voting power
All votes cast in week 2: 2x voting power
All votes cast in week 3: 1.5x voting power
All votes cast in week 4: 1x voting power (no boost)
This ensures that everyone who casted a vote early, didn’t do so for an upfront monetary reward. They did so because their vote counted more early.

Apart from the above, I think these are some potential areas that should help improve governance.

(1) Designate a FOR advocate and an AGAINST advocate for every YIP: Each advocate puts forward analysis & canvasses for/against points amongst the community. These advocates rotate and are different for each YIP. Something like juror selection?

(2) More cost-benefit impact analysis behind each YIP, which also ties back to (1).

(3) Minimum time period plus quorum decay:
(3) (i) Have a minimum time period for each proposal to ensure wide dissemination of notices. Some people may have other work during the week and only check back on weekends. A 3-day period for proposals is insufficient. A 4-week period for each proposal, ensures sufficient awareness time.
(3) (ii) Introduce quorum decay: If a sufficient percentage of the membership has voted in a short period of time, especially on an important issue, then the vote accelerates towards closure. So, for example:

  • When 75% of YFI has voted anytime in the 1st week, it triggers a countdown to closure of the vote in 3 days.
  • In subsequent weeks, the required number of YFI to meet quorum steadily declines e.g. 50%, 25%, 15%.

The steady decline in YFI required to meet quorum - especially when it is pushed out far enough - ensures that any fears of vote manipulation by a small group is dissipated because it is mitigated by the length of time that the vote has been aired. On the other hand, ensuring a high quorum is required for “quick votes” helps ensure that such critical proposals are passed after a broad set of the community has weighed in.

(4) Introduce a cost to submitting a proposal: However, I think this should be an impermanent cost e.g. locking 30 YFI (0.1%) as a proposer for 90 days after the end of the voting period. At the end of the voting period, this should be returned to the YFI. The proposer technically doesn’t receive a monetary penalty as he/she could stake the locked YFI into the rewards contract. But it will help steady the influx of proposals.

(5) Require ALL proposals to go through a pre-vote community discussion: No proposals go on-chain for voting until they have had a preliminary 2-week community discussion.

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This is a good idea economically, because people do not want to waste money. Perhaps if people can combine their holdings so small holders can still contribute without having to find a whale patron.