BTW, agree gYFI should not be transferrable. I’d view it as a locked wrapper. Otherwise, you’re going to see a lot of fishy stuff, like “mature” gYFI being worth more than other YFI. Per my other comment though, I do think 365 days may be too long to reach full “maturity.”
Though there is some complexity here if users add more YFI to their positions later which I’m sure you guys have probably already thought about.
e.g., take 5 YFI to start and deposit lock it as gYFI to vote. Then you add 5 more two months later. Those YFI would have different voting power.
I agree with making voting easier and also with gYFI rewarding longer term thinkers.
I do not support allowing governance votes from anyone who is not using the core staking contract. Creating ban lists for exchanges etc is an unsustainable exercise. I also do not support YFI voting when it is bound in any other lending protocol gaining yield. Many here talk about the double vote problem, but ultimately, obtaining yield reduces the true cost of a governance attack (hedge downside). The sole purpose of YFI should be to govern and if someone chooses to create leverage as collateral, then that must come at the opportunity cost of staking for governance rights. This ensures skin in the game. One must not be able to pass an adverse proposal without wearing the market price reaction.
Support accessibility.
Do not support yield bearing governance nor an attempt at implementing banlists as a mitigation.
I’d prefer banning centralized exchanges by default because of lack of transparency. I guess if there was a DEX that had a DAO contract set up for voting, there’s not much we can do about that because it would be hypocritical to ban them. You’re right in that it’s how we participate in Curve DAO, after all.
I think rewards should only go to governance stakers. This might be incentive enough for people to move their YFI into gov, but it’s possible we could tune this if the staking numbers aren’t good, down the road.
I think that not having vote lock is fine for now. If we do, I don’t think that gYFI should be transferable.
Is there even a way to distribute rewards to yfi holders safely while they are spread all over defi? And also in a way that can’t be gamed? Seems unlikely to me.
When you add a poll, please offer the option to show suppprt for some (but not all) of these ideas. One may support off-chain / no gas voting but oppose allowing YFI on other platforms or in vaults to vote.
This is the most important counterpoint in my opinion. Anything that lowers the opportunity cost of staking actual YFI in the governance contract should be treated EXTREMELY carefully.
We are trying to solve a real near-term problem (high gas prices, which reduce incentive to vote) with a solution that could have dramatic and unforseen long-term consequences. Yearn already helps reduce the impact of high gas prices for users (and therefore the protocol). I worry implementing this for governance for the sake of dividends could be short-sighted.
It’s great to see that governance is getting an upgrade!
Would second this so that we get an accurate ground sentiment for the different ideas.
Adding another voice in support of governance contract staked YFI being the only ones eligible for rewards. IMO we need to be careful about what behavior we want to incentivize.
I think exchanges should be banned. I’d go further to be extra restrictive on our initial whitelist of contracts allowed to vote. Although we have the executive team and multisig as a guard against governance capture, it would still be good to see how this expanded list of voters changes the dynamics on contentious issues before opening it up further.
I would vote against this proposal. In my opinion voting should be limited to those staking and those votes should ideally be on-chain and binding.
Reasons:
Voters need to have skin in the game with a lockup period (ideally longer than the current one) to prevent malicious voting and promote good decision making (think wisdom of the crowd).
Voters should be incentivised to participate in governance (as with the current reward structure) in order to maintain high voter turnout and decentralized decision making.
Voting should be permissionless. No matter who you are, where you’re from, you should be able to participate in governance.
Unless votes are on-chain and binding (e.g. a multisig enforces the vote outcome decision) then voting is just really signalling and control of the protocol still lies with the multisig holders, not the community.
What are the pro’s of the current proposal? I’m open to changing my mind if I am convinced they outweigh the above cons.
I am overall against. It will be complicated to ban exchanges and account for the various and growing defi scenarios where yfi will be used.
I could see the yYFI vault being a reasonable compromise to let YFI holders earn yield and have voting rights. Since the YFI vault will likely have higher yield, they don’t need the governance rewards on top.
May need some fixed weighting of yYFI votes vs gYFI. I do support gYFI
While I’m OK with off-chain voting and blacklisting CEXes, I think voting should only be available to people staked in the governance pool or participating in vaults that are deposited in Yearn-controlled yield farming strategies, and not by people dipping into other protocols chasing yields or LPs creating their own form of risk against their YFI positions and opening YFI up to potential consolidation of governance through malicious actors, black swan events, etc. It also reduces the TVL of Yearn itself, which is to me an important figure in terms of the overall value of the organization.
What CRV is doing, giving its users governance through staking, is much more along the lines of what I think YFI is about - earn tokens for participation and staking. Perhaps it would be better to work on a one on one basis with other protocols like Aave and incentivize those protocols to provide the Yearn contracts with better rates in exchange for delivering governance tokens to Aave, in a sort of tit for tat strategy. Then again YFI was THE governance token, and now it’s sort of taken on a life of its own.
While I like the idea of receiving Y-governance tokens for staking and voting, I’m a little concerned about the concept of more votes leading directly to more rewards, for several reasons. One is that actors could decide to automate their voting process and thereby game the voting system. (There are obviously ways to avoid this, like CAPTCHAS.)
In general I think the proposed method, from a development perspective, currently overcomplicates the process of voting in governance and opens up a number of new gaming strategies on the platform while disincentivizing YFI owners from staking and vaulting into the system. I think it would be good to split up the poll into separate pieces, because while i love the idea of snapshot voting for stakers literally today, some of the other considerations require further discussion about their value-add.
I am also for only YFI staked in gov to be able to vote and receive rewards. You have to make a choice. Are you chasing the high yield or do you want to participate in running the network. Sort of like the private vs public sector jobs.
Not sure if this is the right discussion for this but I would also like gov payouts in YFI instead of YCRV.
I’m very glad to see such a productive discussion here. Can anyone help me collect all the popular options regarding future governance? I want them all polled so we can further iterate in the direction chosen.
@banteg - somewhat unrelated to your post, but if you are working on a comprehensive governance reform overhaul, please consider adding to this a “Require an ‘Abstain’ option be added to every governance vote.” An abstain vote would allow users to claim governance rewards (assuming the current process is maintained), but does not require them to cast a gainful vote on a given proposal to do so.
I think this is better than vote delegation, which would lead users to delegate their votes to a 3rd party, which may lead to protocol politicking. An “abstain” essentially delegates the decision to everyone else in the DAO casting a gainful vote.
If it’s too much to put into this proposal, no worries, though it may be something I propose later. I do fear people coming in right now, weighing in on issues they may not understand and just clicking on whatever is leading, or defaulting to “yes” just to collect gov rewards.
I’d like to see our governance ideally be more thoughtful than that.
