Governance Overhaul and Future Rewards

Proposals Vaults
21

Distribution is not a problem, see this repo, this is what Balancer is moving to for their distribution. It includes tools to post a merkle root on chain and have the users construct merkle proofs to claim their rewards. It also includes a UI for that.

1 Like
22

My understanding is gYFI is the other way around and it works like Curve DAO Voting Escrow.

You vote weight is calculated as amount * time_left / 4 years. So your voting power decreases over time, but you can increase the lock time if you wish.

2 Likes
23

Distribution is not a problem, see this repo, this is what Balancer is moving to for their distribution. It includes tools to post a merkle root on chain and have the users construct merkle proofs to claim their rewards. It also includes a UI for that.

Looks like I missed that. My other concern was how long rewards should be claimable for. Since if governance has power over where it’s stored, governance might want to claim unclaimed funds after some time (I’m bring it up to try to prevent future conflict of interests). But this is not an issue if governance can’t move funds out of it.

24

While in principle I agree that gYFI being transferable is against what gYFI stands for, nothing will stop any dev from making a gYFI wrapper unless we disallow smart contract wallets from gYFI. Personally, I would rather the community use a gYFI that is intended to be transferable than whatever wrapper a random dev makes to do this functionality.

2 Likes
25

This is exactly the type of problems for which SNARKs are for. We could have a contract that collects merkle proofs and posts a single snark => very low fees for its users. Happy to help on this front if useful.

However, I see my proposal as a non-blocking item and as an interesting upgrade

26

Does it have to work that way? I believe @EagleCapital was suggesting that vote power and/or rewards increase over time – say over a 60 day time period such that the value is 1/60 on day 1 and 60/60 after 60 days.

1 Like
27

We don’t need to post the merkle trees on chain. They can be posted on github/ipfs, etc.

28

You post the merkle proof though - in order to withdraw. This costs gas.
My proposal reduces the cost of that gas

29

Yes, users post the proofs and the contract stores the nullifiers for the claimed rewards. It would be great if you could elaborate on the design you suggest.

1 Like
30

Exactly. My proposal is that users give merkle proofs to any node that is willing to aggregate them in a single message (and generate a SNARK) in order to save gas

2 Likes
31

Here’s my first shot at compiling a list of places that could have YFI that is eligible for voting:

Please reply if I have forgotten anything and I will update the list!

3 Likes
32
  1. Banning exchanges shouldn’t be about preventing them from using votes that have been willingly delegated to them, but voting with reserves users deposited to trade. Is it not possible that they could have a separate address for governance staking should they want to offer that service? That’s another reason for weighed time votes - they couldn’t move back and forth so easily. I don’t know how this works at a low level but babysitting blacklists sounds like a fool’s errand.
  2. Rewards should be given to those that stake in governance. If governance staking is possible with vaults without leaking out YFI (e.g. Maker collateral) then it ought to include that. Giving rewards to everyone who happens to vote not only incentivizes apathetic herd voting but it also creates that whole other problem of custodial services and their disinterested holders diluting the protocol. Giving rewards to everyone whether they vote or not however is an interesting question, but it would be difficult to have quorum (with weighted votes you can just have a quorum on the total weighted votes available) and I don’t see why you’d want to dilute the rewards for governance stakers.
  3. Strong for. It aligns stakeholder interests with long-term interest. Concerns about low participation shouldn’t be an issue if the time weights are implemented properly. If you use a system where vote weight accrues over time there isn’t much flash vote risk even in having a small % of YFI in governance. One could argue that having lower yield for gov YFI in a given period/less YFI in governance is not necessarily bad if you can prevent that from being an attack vector.
2 Likes
33

I think it’s going to be difficult to actually “Ban” a centralized exchange. If the exchange was malicious, couldn’t they just transfer to a new address to circumvent the blacklisted main address?

5 Likes
34

Any thoughts on a delegation offering similar to compound. This way an average staker could stake for protocol fees and delegate to a well known entity they feel has their best interests.

1 Like
35

Maybe instead of gYFI, just take snapshot regularly and compare snapshots to calculate time held for the address.

If gYFI’s transferable, there’s nothing stopping a agYFI or gYFI liquidity pool. Game theory will direct every YFI to gYFI and the implementation of gYFI would’ve have made no impact.

1 Like
36

WOW this is pure GREEED, completely eliminates the purpose of staking in the governance pool. This could lead to the downfall of the Yearn.

Give me a rational and not a convoluted answer and I still probably won’t care for it.

This is a joke right. This is essentially VOTE FARMING, get more greedy guys. You’re obsessed with farming.

2 Likes
37

Where are the true OGs here this completely goes against the “0” value Principe of a governance.

Are we trying to vote farm and start teething ourselves everywhere to every pool and get greedy.

You saw what happened to farming and gas prices and the downfall. Don’t create a whole form a bubble

2 Likes
39

You what mate? This proposal doesn’t say you get the rewards while farming, it only expands the scope of voting. Only the governance pool gets the rewards, as it is now.

15 Likes
40

Overall, I support this proposal.

But I would exclude YFI in the Lending protocols, e.g. Aave, CREAM.
This will prevent double counting.
Also if you are lending your YFI token, you are essentially lending your right to vote.

4 Likes
41

The SEC has a bit of a weaponized Howey Law approach in crypto.
Still no clear rule set toward whether an asset is a security.
An uncharitable attitude toward lowering the acreditted investor definition.
Im nervous that a centralized exchange could become a conduit for the SEC in future, to go after any/all investors or assets they arbitrarily deem a security.