I don’t disagree that people were talking about potentially being rewarded CRV by staking in the yCRV vault but nothing was official. I’ll just say that YFI is in good hands, imagine if option 2 was put up for a vote, then all that CRV would be liquidated and be distributed straight to the YFI governance pool, but everyone came to a middle ground and decided that locking up all of that vested CRV would be better use to benefit everyone in the yCRV vault. Pre-yCRV LPs are probably going to be getting more rewards than if they chose to claim their share. This YIP is about sustainability and what’s best for the yearn project to grow.
This is your opinion. Some preCRV LP would like to liquidate their CRV and do whatever they want with it. There is others options that are not even in the pool, like give the CRV to the owner of them.
Ok, despite my sarcasm, I am genuinely curious, who will be sued? Are we going to sue the largest YFI holders? Sue Andre? I guess I’m not saying its impossible, but it doesn’t seem easy. What if they aren’t in America?
“Who will be sued?” This is a really good question, and I don’t know the answer. It may not be this project, but if there is enough money floating in these protocols, someone will find a way to sue. Who has jurisdiction? Who knows? If I was in law school this is the area I would be looking to get into. It is wide open and completely fascinating. Maybe there is a lawyer here that is in a better position to speculate than I am.
If a US court rules they have jurisdiction, then it won’t matter that the defendant is not in the US. Enforcing monetary penalties is also straightforward: since centralized stablecoins like USDC can be blacklisted on a court order, simply being globally dispersed is not as unassailable a defence against legal threats as some seem to think.
To be maximally clear, since it seems to be necessary in this thread, I’m not making a “threat”. I’m simply pointing out that legal action is a real risk that should be managed.
Exactly. Please don’t shit-talk the messengers! People seem to have constructed a fantasy that because a DAO isn’t actually located anywhere it is immune to or inaccessible to the reach of nation states. This is dangerous thinking, and to put that another way, thinking otherwise is far more dangerous than farming YAMs or Spaghetti or any other unaudited contract.
Vested CRV can be claimed by any account to the Strategy addresses using CurveVesting.claim(address)
Strategies have Strategy.withdraw(address) function which can send any airdropped token to the controller
The problem is controller doesn’t have any function that just claims the tokens for further processing, the only function interacting with Strategy.withdraw(address) is Controller.yearn(address _strategy, address _token, uint parts) which recycles the received token for Controller.want(), in this case for yCRV.
Luckily for us, we can use Strategy.set_controller(address) to replace the controller for a new one
The new controller will be able to call
CurveVesting.claim(address) to claim the vested tokens
Strategy.withdraw(address) to withdraw them to the controller
Call create_lock , deposit_for , increase_amount , increase_unlock_time on CurveVotingEscrow
deposit_for might actually be interesting if we want to manage this outside of controller since Curve DAO may evolve over the years.
CurveVotingEscrowdoesn’t allow deposits from non-whitelisted smart contracts . Curve DAO needs to create a smart wallet registry contract, commit_smart_wallet_checker and apply_smart_wallet_checker on the voting escrow and we need to vote our controller to the whitelist. We need to work with Curve community to do this.
Boosting the rewards: still not clear how it works and if it can be delegated, TBD
Delegating Curve DAO voting rights to YFI holders: TBD
So with the actual situation at Curve, it proof that keeping the crv from the LP was a bad idea. Now our crv are useless and they are stock there. That was a really bad YIP
I don’t think you understand the situation but I’m more than happy to help you understand.
around 567k CRV were acquire by preCRV LP. YFI voted to keep these CRV (that are on a vesting period) to boost the gauge for ypool. With the actual voting situation at Curve, it most likely will be hard to keep our boost using the CRV. Therefore bringing the YIP37 advantage lower.
CurveVotingEscrowdoesn’t allow deposits from non-whitelisted smart contracts . Curve DAO needs to create a smart wallet registry contract, commit_smart_wallet_checker and apply_smart_wallet_checker on the voting escrow and we need to vote our controller to the whitelist. We need to work with Curve community to do this.
Aren’t contracts going to be whitelisted with all this curve drama? One thing less.