Yes to someone they and the network trusts
Edit: one more thing to note is offering people a return in YFI for governance may work to help the network too. Our threat is loaning YFI. We need to bring it home. I know why I’m farming not voting, i want paid in YFI and dont want to convert Ycrv. My understanding is people could sit in governance and not even have to vote and collect payment. The only change here to bring me back into it would be pay me in something i want
That is the concern a lot of people have, but I thought you believed the concern was overstated because we could have leaders who would look after us and veto malicious votes. Even if YFI is home in vaults but not in governance, there is risk of malicious voting.
I take it you are in the camp seeking greater yield than is available in the governance pool. How can we bring you and others like you back home in a way that would let you vote and earn a sufficient yield? You clearly are against having a gYFI token for governance while allowing you to earn high yield on YFI. Is it just a matter of letting YFI in vaults to vote? What if that vault strategy lends YFI to earn you that yield? In that case we would have double voting.
There are at least three motivations to contend with here, being 1) good governance for long term benefit to all, 2) greed that can sway people to a) think short-term or b) think about themselves, and 3) preventing manipulation of the protocol by insiders or outsiders. After reading about the potential manipulation by those borrowing YFI, I agree there needs to be some safety net built-in. What makes this more complicated is that we don’t know vote by vote what affect a decision can have on all of us, and there are only a few days to decide or gather support.
As I wrote days back, I think any increase on vote based on staking time should be capped at 25% or less. Otherwise, we potentially devalue the overall coin in the market by making it hard for newcomers to feel involved. I think a better way to handle a bad influence taking over or even causing a short-term issue is to raise the vote threshold hold to 60% instead of the 51%. That in and of itself would make it more expensive to swing a vote, and it ensures that we have more of a quorum than a 51% split that could cause bad feelings. The premise for this is that the current product is great, so we should make the difficulty to change it a bit harder. It also requires more consensus building rather than hunkering down to hold your stake the longest. Again, if staking gives a very slight bump-up, then OK, but I want to address the greed for oneself. Even if the long-term staker’s vote is maybe 25% higher, the amount of profit per coin should remain equal (no 25% bump-up on distribution). That forces those who staked longer to have done it because they care about an issue or governance, not because they get more financial gain than any other coin holder. The coin price in and of itself is a reflection of how good the protocol is and its potential revenue value over time. We want the price to reflect that potential revenue and its liquidity. If we limit the coins value by the time factors mentioned, then we decrease the value of all of our coins. I don’t think having a separate coin is the right move at least at this point in time when things are working relatively well. I think just starting off by increasing the quorum to 60% would help get rid of some of the outside manipulation fears, and give us confidence that a small majority can cause a problem. I know the US Senate has its issues and doesn’t even require 60% for some things anymore, but that is because of their opposing ideologies that hopefully do not exist in this community. The 60% cloture vote for 100s of years kept bad laws from being passed even when many of them were on the take (from outside influences).
That is a significant threat. As @Joey pointed out, at least now we can rely on Andre and the multisig to step in and effectively veto an obviously malicious vote. As long as they remain able and willing to do that, we should be ok, but this is not a long-term solution.
So then we are looking at whether we should be concerned about increasing governance participation or not. As things are progressing, I foresee the possibility that YFI holders increasingly find more lucrative uses for their YFI than staking in governance and participating in governance. If we can put aside the risk of a malicious actor getting a malicious vote actually implemented, we still have the possibility that only a very few YFI holders actually use them in governance.
If you believe that greater participation leads to greater value, then we should be framing these discussions in that context.
That said, participation takes many forms and both ideas and work product can be contributed without voting.
For me I just dont want payment in yCRV. Without intervention, I want my payment in YFI. Thats it. Id be govern all the way except USD means nothing to me compared to more YFI. Maybe our reserves should convert to YFI for governor payouts? Thatd bring me back. Edit: as a note here, i would accept much lower yield for yield as long as i get YFI payment to help the network by not loaning
I still have the concern of malicious voting through loans of course! I think semi-centralized helps, not fixes
I cannot tell if your aversion to the USD is because you are outside the United States, do not like fiat, want an appreciating asset rather than a stablecoin, or something else. But why not just periodically convert to YFI? I guess transaction costs could be a factor or you are looking for a set-it and forget-it approach. Most YFI holders are pretty hands-on I would guess.
I’d be ok with my governance reward paid in YFI, and incrementally that would take some YFI off the market and put it in the hands of those demonstrating an interest in governance. But if the yield is higher elsewhere you may be better off financially just taking the yield and buying YFI. Ideally, one could do both – earn a high yield and participate in governance – but that leads to a gYFI token or another change in the voting rules such that high yield earning YFI can vote, but it is not offered for lending, which could lead to double voting and the other lending risks we have been discussing.
I dont like the concept of persistently missing runs unless I remember to convert. I imagine myself spending $40 in eth fees and dealing with slippage and then redepositing is not for me when yvault pays YFI.
I get it! As long as the YFI price is increasing.
A couple of ideas to guide the fine tuning of the weighting:
If the main concern is to prevent vote manipulation via secondary markets it should be kept in mind that 365 days is completely arbitrary. The length of time that actually matters is the average length of time from a proposal’s inception to when the deciding vote is cast - which so far is a matter of a couple of weeks usually. Allowing a little leeway for more serious proposals that may occur in the future that require more consideration, maybe a couple of months would suffice?
The turnover of staked YFI begins to matter a lot obviously. In the scenario where say only half of staked YFI is held long term, fully vested YFI is worth twice as much for governance purposes. Given there is at least one whale group (who hold 16%!) and other voting blocks may form in the future, it’d pretty easy for them to steer the project in any way they wish. It’s too early into the lifespan of the project to estimate what the rate of turnover will be, but it’s obvious that for the sake decentralized governance the rate of turnover should be minimized.
So a short period risks vote manipulation via leveraged secondary market malarkey and a long period risks the project becoming sclerotic and unable to counter potential outsized influence of small voting blocks. Maybe a compromise where no portion of voting rights are conferred at all for
say the first 60 days and then are rapidly conferred over the following 60?
Paid in yfi for Gov would be great, should have a option of gyfi or yfi??
I won’t argue, I will take them both.
Bumping this because I believe it should be revisited and proposed. Time weighted voting improves security as it incentivizes keeping YFI in governance
EDIT: We need to seriously think about various methods to further incentivize YFI stability within governance. (Get people in, keep people in) This gives more influence to those who are here for the longer term health and overall sustainability of the YFI ecosystem
This is a very thoughtful proposal @xKingFisherx I support that. In response to your second point, I´d just say, let´s make sure that we are the long term holders. 
Thx @CryptoCap to bring this up again.
How does one get gYFI? and when will this go LIVE?
I believe the intention is that gYFI would go live if this proposal passes, there is no gYFI currently.
Unsure when it goes to official vote or goes live though?
thanks for the response.
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