# Request for Comment. Proposal for government restructuring **URL:** \ **Category:** Vaults\ **Created:** [27 July 2020 05:26 UTC](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/request-for-comment-proposal-for-government-restructuring/1143 "2020-07-27T05:26:40Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 5
**Author:** ![markpui](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.yearn.fi/markpui/32/80_2.png) [@markpui](https://gov.yearn.fi/u/markpui)\ **Post date:** [27 July 2020 23:23 UTC](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/request-for-comment-proposal-for-government-restructuring/1143/5 "2020-07-27T23:23:46Z")
Firstly, I think now that [YIP 10: Transitionary YFI Only Voting](http://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-10-transitionary-yfi-only-voting/481) has passed, we should stick with the existing system for awhile, to understand how group-wide voting among YFI holders is functioning for awhile. This will allow us to detect if there are any issues and address them over time. Secondly, it is a good point re: trying to encourage voting to meet quorum. The problem however lies in the following: Incentivizing people to vote may lead to people voting _regardless of their beliefs_ just for the sake of a reward. Typically, such incentive behaviour means the person who votes _solely for the reward_ tries to vote with the crowd (whichever vote is leading at the time) on the principle that he/she will try to “do no harm” by sticking with the crowd. This also leads to the variant (which I do not support) which is to _incentivize early voting_ by offering rewards to voters in an early period (e.g. 1st 24 hours). **A method of incentivizing early voting without the corruptive distortion of monetary incentives** : The model that I like for incentivizing early voting is to **give additional voting power on early votes cast**. Here is an example (assumes a 4-week voting period): All votes cast in week 1: 2.5x voting power All votes cast in week 2: 2x voting power All votes cast in week 3: 1.5x voting power All votes cast in week 4: 1x voting power (no boost) **This ensures that everyone who casted a vote early, didn’t do so for an upfront monetary reward. They did so because their vote counted more early.** Apart from the above, I think these are some potential areas that should help improve governance. (1) **Designate a FOR advocate and an AGAINST advocate for every YIP:** Each advocate puts forward analysis & canvasses for/against points amongst the community. These advocates rotate and are different for each YIP. Something like juror selection? (2) **More cost-benefit impact analysis behind each YIP** , which also ties back to (1). (3) **Minimum time period plus quorum decay** : (3) (i) Have a **minimum time period for each proposal to ensure wide dissemination of notices**. Some people may have other work during the week and only check back on weekends. A 3-day period for proposals is insufficient. A **4-week period for each proposal, ensures sufficient awareness time**. (3) (ii) **Introduce quorum decay** : If a sufficient percentage of the membership has voted in a short period of time, especially on an important issue, then the vote accelerates towards closure. So, for example: - When 75% of YFI has voted anytime in the 1st week, it triggers a countdown to closure of the vote in 3 days. - In subsequent weeks, the required number of YFI to meet quorum steadily declines e.g. 50%, 25%, 15%. The steady decline in YFI required to meet quorum - especially when it is pushed out far enough - ensures that any fears of vote manipulation by a small group is dissipated because it is mitigated by the length of time that the vote has been aired. On the other hand, ensuring a high quorum is required for “quick votes” helps ensure that such critical proposals are passed after a broad set of the community has weighed in. (4) **Introduce a cost to submitting a proposal** : However, I think this should be an impermanent cost e.g. locking 30 YFI (0.1%) as a proposer _for 90 days after the end of the voting period_. At the end of the voting period, this should be returned to the YFI. The proposer technically doesn’t receive a monetary penalty as he/she could stake the locked YFI into the rewards contract. But it will help steady the influx of proposals. (5) **Require ALL proposals to go through a pre-vote community discussion** : No proposals go on-chain for voting until they have had a _preliminary 2-week community discussion_. --- _[View the full topic](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/request-for-comment-proposal-for-government-restructuring/1143)._