# Request for Comment. Proposal for government restructuring

**URL:** <https://gov.yearn.fi/t/request-for-comment-proposal-for-government-restructuring/1143>\
**Category:** Vaults\
**Created:** [27 July 2020 05:26 UTC](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/request-for-comment-proposal-for-government-restructuring/1143 "2020-07-27T05:26:40Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 6\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![amaz\_ng](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/34f0e0/32.png) [@amaz\_ng](https://gov.yearn.fi/u/amaz_ng)\
**Post date:** [27 July 2020 05:26 UTC](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/request-for-comment-proposal-for-government-restructuring/1143/1 "2020-07-27T05:26:40Z")

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**TLDR: Imitate what works in a publicly traded company.**

We could have a “board of directors” that is elected in a staggered way that controls an amount of votes that is divided up and \<= a quorum. Perhaps the directors could specialize and dole out grants in their departments using money from a "YIP 14"like system. This way governance can be more efficiently done. By limiting the directors to less than a quorum it is ensured that if they tried to sneakily push through bad legislation they could be stopped by the YFI holders’ nay. Additionally, voters are rewarded for voting with a share of Ycrv earnings, incentivising engagement with the YIP’s. It is essential that what we create is flexible with adversity and fair to the token holders. This solution introduces a way to allow those who the community believes in to make decisions more effectively.

**Why we need this**  
If anything bad happens to this contract it is essential to quickly discuss, and patch a fix. By the consolidation of different types of experts we can expertly and efficiently propose and implement a solution, even if no one is watching.

**Implementation Thoughts**

This board could moderate the forum and pin essential forum posts to the decentralized voting page.

The board could get a reward.

People could give their vote to let someone else use it

Please modify this any which way I merely want to discuss how we make decisions.

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**Author:** ![CarlosDanger](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.yearn.fi/carlosdanger/32/26_2.png) [@CarlosDanger](https://gov.yearn.fi/u/CarlosDanger)\
**Post date:** [27 July 2020 05:59 UTC](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/request-for-comment-proposal-for-government-restructuring/1143/2 "2020-07-27T05:59:29Z")

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I like this idea. I think we need a mechanism for holders to participate, but would be good to make sure that we don’t accidentally shoot ourselves in the face. More professional mgmt would help with that.

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**Author:** ![guyi](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/ac8455/32.png) [@guyi](https://gov.yearn.fi/u/guyi)\
**Post date:** [27 July 2020 11:37 UTC](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/request-for-comment-proposal-for-government-restructuring/1143/3 "2020-07-27T11:37:00Z")

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Don’t reinvent the wheel, just use voting delegation so everyone can choose who to delegate their vote to.

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**Author:** ![1centwhale](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.yearn.fi/1centwhale/32/2872_2.png) [@1centwhale](https://gov.yearn.fi/u/1centwhale)\
**Post date:** [27 July 2020 21:29 UTC](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/request-for-comment-proposal-for-government-restructuring/1143/4 "2020-07-27T21:29:26Z")

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Is there any documentation on delegating votes and if it’s working for other protocols? If it’s working then great, it seems like a no brainer! I know that personally I’m not voting on all things Comp and I still don’t delegate my votes. That’s not good and so ideally there is a better way to create community engagement. Not sure what the perfect solution is but I agree with @amaz_ng that we need a way to move quickly when it’s called for. Yes on YIP 12 hopefully fixes part of it but might not be enough.

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**Author:** ![markpui](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.yearn.fi/markpui/32/80_2.png) [@markpui](https://gov.yearn.fi/u/markpui)\
**Post date:** [27 July 2020 23:23 UTC](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/request-for-comment-proposal-for-government-restructuring/1143/5 "2020-07-27T23:23:46Z")

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Firstly, I think now that [YIP 10: Transitionary YFI Only Voting](http://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-10-transitionary-yfi-only-voting/481) has passed, we should stick with the existing system for awhile, to understand how group-wide voting among YFI holders is functioning for awhile. This will allow us to detect if there are any issues and address them over time.

Secondly, it is a good point re: trying to encourage voting to meet quorum. The problem however lies in the following: Incentivizing people to vote may lead to people voting _regardless of their beliefs_ just for the sake of a reward. Typically, such incentive behaviour means the person who votes _solely for the reward_ tries to vote with the crowd (whichever vote is leading at the time) on the principle that he/she will try to “do no harm” by sticking with the crowd. This also leads to the variant (which I do not support) which is to _incentivize early voting_ by offering rewards to voters in an early period (e.g. 1st 24 hours).

**A method of incentivizing early voting without the corruptive distortion of monetary incentives** : The model that I like for incentivizing early voting is to **give additional voting power on early votes cast**. Here is an example (assumes a 4-week voting period):  
All votes cast in week 1: 2.5x voting power  
All votes cast in week 2: 2x voting power  
All votes cast in week 3: 1.5x voting power  
All votes cast in week 4: 1x voting power (no boost)  
**This ensures that everyone who casted a vote early, didn’t do so for an upfront monetary reward. They did so because their vote counted more early.**

Apart from the above, I think these are some potential areas that should help improve governance.

(1) **Designate a FOR advocate and an AGAINST advocate for every YIP:** Each advocate puts forward analysis & canvasses for/against points amongst the community. These advocates rotate and are different for each YIP. Something like juror selection?

(2) **More cost-benefit impact analysis behind each YIP** , which also ties back to (1).

(3) **Minimum time period plus quorum decay** :  
(3) (i) Have a **minimum time period for each proposal to ensure wide dissemination of notices**. Some people may have other work during the week and only check back on weekends. A 3-day period for proposals is insufficient. A **4-week period for each proposal, ensures sufficient awareness time**.  
(3) (ii) **Introduce quorum decay** : If a sufficient percentage of the membership has voted in a short period of time, especially on an important issue, then the vote accelerates towards closure. So, for example:

- When 75% of YFI has voted anytime in the 1st week, it triggers a countdown to closure of the vote in 3 days.
- In subsequent weeks, the required number of YFI to meet quorum steadily declines e.g. 50%, 25%, 15%.

The steady decline in YFI required to meet quorum - especially when it is pushed out far enough - ensures that any fears of vote manipulation by a small group is dissipated because it is mitigated by the length of time that the vote has been aired. On the other hand, ensuring a high quorum is required for “quick votes” helps ensure that such critical proposals are passed after a broad set of the community has weighed in.

(4) **Introduce a cost to submitting a proposal** : However, I think this should be an impermanent cost e.g. locking 30 YFI (0.1%) as a proposer _for 90 days after the end of the voting period_. At the end of the voting period, this should be returned to the YFI. The proposer technically doesn’t receive a monetary penalty as he/she could stake the locked YFI into the rewards contract. But it will help steady the influx of proposals.

(5) **Require ALL proposals to go through a pre-vote community discussion** : No proposals go on-chain for voting until they have had a _preliminary 2-week community discussion_.

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**Author:** ![amaz\_ng](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/34f0e0/32.png) [@amaz\_ng](https://gov.yearn.fi/u/amaz_ng)\
**Post date:** [27 July 2020 23:43 UTC](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/request-for-comment-proposal-for-government-restructuring/1143/6 "2020-07-27T23:43:24Z")

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> [@markpui](#):
>
> **Introduce a cost to submitting a proposal** : However, I think this should be an impermanent cost e.g. locking 30 YFI (0.1%) as a proposer _for 90 days after the end of the voting period_ . At the end of the voting period, this should be returned to the YFI. The proposer technically doesn’t receive a monetary penalty as he/she could stake the locked YFI into the rewards contract. But it will help steady the influx of proposals.

This is a good idea economically, because people do not want to waste money. Perhaps if people can combine their holdings so small holders can still contribute without having to find a whale patron.