I voted against because there is no information on emission rate if we continue to distribute YFI to all pools. I wouldn’t say it’s about “early” farmers making 100x but farmers who stress testing the system and taking 100x the risk. And they should be rewarded as such.
Though, I do agree that having a finite cap is not sustainable. With a right YFI emission rate, I am sure we would get more votes to increase the cap.
I voted against p0 to provide more time for discourse and planning. I do think emission should be continued and a cap set, though. My thoughts:
I voted against (for now). Since everything is still so new, let’s wait a bit to decide such critical tokenomics. We can always vote again to enable further emission once we have more time to see things through.
You got a TL;DR for the rationale? lol
The SNX model of time locked rewards prevents too much supply being dumped from farmers like you have with BAL and COMP - I think this is why most people are voting to cap supply, but inflationary rewards is a great incentive to investors, especially if fee protocol dividends are distributed on top based on staked YFI.
Don’t think it’s possible to vote without having a clear idea of what supply models are possible, it’s not a binary finite vs infinite choice as the options currently imply - we should have another vote on this once it’s fleshed out a bit.
No more inflation means 0 incentives for LP to provide liquidity. Since there are no lockups on capital, this will result in a quick exodus of capital as yield on YFI goes down to 0 instantly (excluding trading fees and interest rates).
Original capital in ycurve pool was around 6-9m before YFI was launched. Be prepared to see current 100m+ TVL go back down if this proposal fails.
I believe a better scenario would be a gradual decrease in YFI inflation.
The follow-up proposal to determine the weekly distribution quota for an indication of what the inflation could be, should be proposed in conjunction with this proposal. This is so monetary policy could be more predictable to token holders.
Vote “FOR” for the continued longevity of the protocol.
So you’re pretty much going to sell kek. Good one there Mr.Sadim
Given that YFI is basically subsidizing yield to attract liquidity, can we have a model where the issuance of YFI is determined by its price and the current liquidity, targeting a given yield increase?
For example, if the current liquidity is $100, the price of YFI is $1 and we want to subsidize the yield by 10%, there should be 10 tokens issued annualy. The issuance can be adjusted in the contract by calling a function, once the parameters are voted and set in the protocol.
“AGAINST : No more YFI tokens will be distributed. Global supply is locked at 30000 YFI permanently.”
The languaging is rather severe. If this does not pass, will there be another opportunity to propose a new hard cap and emission rate?
Agree with this. An SNX like model with escrowed and decreasing emission rate YFI after the initial 30k minting is done is probably the best model to ensure deep liquidity and high use of ycurve pool.
Liquidity pools can also be subsidized by dedicating a portion of the rewards (fees) for it. Don’t necessarily need more token issuance for that.
Can YFI mining use the bitcoin halving mechanism? for example 20% token discount each week to convergence the limit to 150000
I really think that the protocol will continue to grow and have usage without YFI inflation, because the product is superior.
And, BAL and CRV and others will have their emission events going on for years, so people would still flock to yearn.fiance to farm those.
We absolutely don’t need to inflate to still be the best offer in town.
30k forever 
Voted against.
To be honest, the YFI ecosystem is quite complex at the moment: Tokens within contracts within contracts to yield tokens to put in contracts to vote and get tokens… or something.
I think it would help if someone could draw a clear picture on how things are intertwined and which levers we can pull.
(EDIT2: @Weeb_Mcgee did it: https://twitter.com/Weeb_Mcgee/status/1285397420373708801?s=20)
Then we need to agree on targets (liquidity, adoption, volume, fees,…) and identify which levers help to achieve these. YFI is one powerful lever but only one type of incentivization. Maybe not the ideal one?
(EDIT: @gonchs already goes down that road: What metrics should we focus on?)
I tend towards “against” until we had time for more discussion, but I am happy if someone convinces me to vote “for”.
Of course there will be, you just make another proposal that says you agree proposal 0 is null and void.
vote for needs to be clearer IMO.
If vote for maybe it should be heavily favoring early stress testers something like after the initial 30k distributed in week 1 after that follow something super conservative like a BTC model, but with halving every 52 weeks (1 yr).
So its almost like initial users “premined” YFI in the first week.
YFI distribution could be something like this:
week 1: 30k YFI
week 2: 50 YFI
week 3: 50 YFI
.
.
.
week 52: 50 YFI
week 53: 25 YFI
.
.
.
week 104: 25 YFI
week 105: 12.5 YFI
etc etc
IMO the meme value of perfectly fair distribution+ hard cap is enormous and should not be given up easily (I voted no). It is very unlikely that someone else with Andre’s competencies repeat what he did with YFI. Could we implement a system that automatically burn portions of tokens that are not either:
-staked
-in a liquidity pool
This is equivalent to issuance through staking, has taxes advantages and does not break the meme.
This does not solve the liquidity mining incentives but does encourage liquidity/participation a la SNX. If we want to give other liquidity incentives I think the best is to redirect portion of the non-pool related fees collected towards the pools.
Timelock is sublime.