# Parasitic Farms

**URL:** <https://gov.yearn.fi/t/parasitic-farms/1100>\
**Category:** Technical Discussion\
**Created:** [26 July 2020 22:35 UTC](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/parasitic-farms/1100 "2020-07-26T22:35:51Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 4

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**Author:** ![alizk](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.yearn.fi/alizk/32/913_2.png) [@alizk](https://gov.yearn.fi/u/alizk)\
**Post date:** [25 August 2020 19:25 UTC](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/parasitic-farms/1100/4 "2020-08-25T19:25:29Z")

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Gas costs should inhibit parasitic farms from attracting liquidity. They would need to attract sufficiently large TVL from sufficiently large set of users such that:

(1) the gas cost of rebalancing/rotating their funds \< yEarn gas cost + YFI fees, and  
(2) their farm has enough interactions from users to constantly trigger the rebalncing/rotation and achieve the same optimality as yEarn.

Recall: yEarn contracts are “asleep”, they don’t just rebalance/rotate on their own … they only do so when a user interact with them in some way by depositing/withdrawing etc.

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_[View the full topic](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/parasitic-farms/1100)._
