Wouldn’t YFI treasury naturally get part of the benefit via higher veCRV staked leading to higher boost for CRV reward, which partly goes to the treasury if I understand it correctly?
Farming: Also agree with 50/50 farming options A and B like @cryptoyieldinfo said
Distribution: Agree with @EtherMoose’s take and option A makes a lot of sense. Option C seems to be not an ideal path
Option A seems the best to me but i would be alright with B
Totally agreed. As a yveCRV holder, I would like the option to chose what to do with my EPS share.
If yveCRV Sushi LPs were given the EPS airdrop, liquidity and volume on Sushi may go up considerably; this would be a significant net-benefit for the whole Yearn ecosytem.
What about LPs supplying liquidity to the ETH/yveCRV pool on SushiSwap?
Under Distribution Option A or B, yes - but that’s not what I was talking about here.
I agree. I think in lieu of some sort of a yveEPS vault and airdrop, passing on the $EPS tokens to yveCRV holders once they’ve vested would be the fairest option.
Not sure how costly it is logistically, but the fairest situation would probably involve:
This would ensure that holders of yveCRV (incl. the LP’s) at each airdrop date get a similar outcome to what they would have if they had held on to their veCRV.
The main reason for matching the weekly snapshots with the airdrops would be to ensure longer-term holders of yveCRV aren’t diluted by newer holders coming in later during the airdrop window.
The BUSD generated throughout all of the 3-month vesting periods could be kept by YFI treasury to compensate for the additional work to implement.
If we can build a model like this that demonstrates yveCRV holders maintain the key benefits of veCRV ownership (excl. boosts + gauge weight voting etc.), then the value of yveCRV does not decrease relative to veCRV, which would discourage others from locking their CRV for yveCRV. It is not unlikely future drops like this will occur for veCRV holders, so it sets a great precedent and won’t discourage others from locking up their CRV into yveCRV longer term.
I am not smart enough to know what to do, but trust the community will do what’s best for us backscratchers/sushi LPs
The problem with this is that you are not considering the Vault LPs.
For instance, myself and others have contributed allot of veCRV through being an LP in the vaults (which convert 10% of all earnings into veCRV). It doesn’t make sense to not reward this.
Ideally you would reward people for how much veCRV they contributed to Yearn - either via the backscratcher or being a Curve Vault LP - but it most likely won’t be easy to construct such an overview.
This makes option A the most fair imo. Both regular vault LPs benefit (from an increase in the boost), as well as backscratcher LPs (due to a boost in the veCRV/yveCRV supply ratio).
Agree with this take, not to mention users that never actually locked any CRV but just purchased yveCRV - fair to say they are providing some sort of value in offering liquidity for the original vault users.
Assume you’re referring to LP’s and Vault participants in vaults not directly related to yveCRV? (ie. in non yveCRV vaults from which 10% of profits have been reinvested to purchase veCRV).
If so, that definitely makes sense and yes, agree that in the ideal scenario all participants should benefit relative to contribution as much as possible.
My thoughts on this were that there are basically 2 ‘pools’ of veCRV for any airdops or one-off distributions like this:
#1: “Yearn veCRV”. This should be the veCRV you’re referring to (ie. all veCRV that’s NOT directly been contributed/locked by users in the yveCRV vault). This could be considered equally contributed by all Yearn participants (including yveCRV participants to a small relative degree), and owned by the YFI treasury.
#2:“yveCRV veCRV”. The veCRV directly locked in the yveCRV vault by users. Given 1CRV = 1yveCRV = 1veCRV, it’s important that this pool is treated separately and this 1:1 relationship is maintained in any distribution to avoid devaluing yveCRV relative to veCRV (and therefore discouraging any future lockups!)
On that basis, it should be relatively easy to do a weighted allocation between pools #1 and #2, relative to the veCRV in each - or ideally using a snapshot of all yveCRV holders + LP’s on each airdrop date and subtracting that total from the total veCRV held by Yearn.
This way, the Yearn ecosystem benefits directly from #1, and individual yveCRV holders/LP’s that hold an asset targeting a 1:1 relationship with CRV will also be rewarded on that basis so we preserve the value of yveCRV.
Yeah agree with this also. For Pool #2 (“yveCRV veCRV”) it should be determined by who is holding the yveCRV or LP tokens at the date of airdrop.
Here is my vote.
BTW, we should make decisions as quick as possible.
ycrvUSDN was selected to contribute 50% of it’s harvest to buying yveCRV. I think LPs of that pool should have a proportional part of the distribution.
I’m not sure I agree. I think of the 10% curve donation as a cost of being a user, I dont think of it as a gift/donation from a vault user to Yearn and I don’t think it should still be considered user funds, same as the other fees you pay to use the vaults. The vault user immediately benefits from these CRV tokens in the form of added boost.
When you deposit your own curve into the backscratcher, the dynamic is very different. You’re not giving CRV to Yearn because you want to use the vaults and it is part of the cost of use, youre giving CRV to Yearn because Yearn needs your CRV and is willing to offer you additional value in return.
Users will continue to use the vaults because they want to use the vaults. This will not change regardless of what we decide to do with the EPS tokens.
However, what we decide here will likely influence potential yveCRV-Dao depositors. We want to maximize their incentive to provide their CRV to Yearn, and giving them the choice re: their airdrop would provide maximum flexibility and would make the backscratcher lucrative no matter what the goals of the depositor.
We don’t want our decision here to prevent anybody from depositing their CRV. If that is the end result of this vote, I would say we missed a huge opportunity.
If someone wants their EPS, and Yearn wants their CRV, we certainly should be willing and able to do that for them.
These would not actually be owned by the Treasury, but by the backscratcher. It would provide value to Yearn in the form of increased APY for backscratcher depositors, driving more people to deposit CRV tokens.
Its an indirect benefit only, and doesnt provide Yearn with any cashflow. But it certainly benefits Yearn.
Just want to make sure everyone is on the same page
Though I would potentially agree for more pressing decisions, I’m not sure I see any reason to rush this particular decision
Does the passing of time have some negative influence on the rewards available to us?
We should take whatever time it takes to make sure we get incentives aligned in a maximally beneficial way, for both ecosystem participants and Yearn itself.
I notice quite a few people like Option B. Could someone explain the value of distribution option B over option A?
Option A and B provide the same amount of added 3crv rewards for Backscratcher users
Option A increases incentives for future depositors, Option B does not
Unless I’m missing something, option A would be better than B for Yearn moving forward, and wouldnt cost users anything that they’d get with option B
So isnt Option A better for everyone?
Edit: I figured out what I was missing. Option A would entail sharing the additional APY from your share of the EPS tokens with all future backscratcher depositors, which takes value away from the existing depositors who actually earned the airdrop. Its a trade-off.
StakeDao currently has a proposal for the same situation (their sdveCRV vault, similar to Yearn’s yveCRV).
The mechanism for distributing airdrop seems to have been previously settled - the proposal is actually for the farming strategy.
Airdop is going to sdveCRV holders:
“We should take weekly snapshots of sdveCRV-DAO holders and stakers, and distribute any tokens proportionally.”
https://snapshot.org/#/stakedao.eth/proposal/QmSJJ3Rk9hUCiVcVXdwe7GwgQBh3nA9HKRkoqPofzJ3hMU
I was thinking about this. Yearn has contributed about 20% of the veCRV currently in backscratcher and 3rd parties about 80%
FARMING
What if each week yearn decides penalty or stake. This is just a calc based on a pre-set trigger. If APY for farming > X then we take penalty and unlock EPS, if < X we leave staked for 90 days.
DISTRIBUTION
If we go the unlock+penalty route yearn’s 20% (or whatever exact % is at that time) farms eventual contribute as more vecrv to backscratcher. Also if unlock+penalty yvecrv holders get airdropped their pro-rata EPS. Alternatively, if we stake then yearn is entitled to 20% of staked amount at release and vecrv holders get their pro-rata portion at release based on snapshot.
Everything stays proportional. Neither yearn nor yvecrv holders benefit more than intended by the arrangement. Keeps vecrv holders incentivized to use vaults as yearn will act in good faith. Also adds some more vecrv to backscratcher based on yearn’s 20% contribution to the vault. Yearn will keep 20% of it EPS stake (maybe 10% if all penalty) for good long term relations with EPS.
Long-term commitment to Ellipse over short-term benefit, the same way we commit to Curve.
Let holders decide what todo.
Another option for the distribution could be:
FARMING
What if each week yearn decides penalty or stake. This is just a calc based on a pre-set trigger. If APY for farming > X then we take penalty and unlock EPS, if < X we leave staked for 90 days.
DISTRIBUTION
Since the current vecrv in the backscratcher was apx 80% contributed by 3rd parties and 20% by yearn we could do:
20% - Option A
80% - Option B